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Abstract 
 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Parents 
Involved, 2007), a highly contentious, and divided, Supreme Court invalidated race-conscious 
admissions plans in two urban school systems, Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky on 
the basis that they were insufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling 
governmental interest. As such, Parents Involved was the latest chapter in the Court‟s almost 
forty-year history of reaching mixed results in such far-reaching areas involving race-conscious 
remedies as admissions to higher education, employment in the general workforce and in 
education, minority set aside programs, and voting rights. In light of the impact that Supreme 
Court cases on race-conscious remedies have in education, particularly in urban settings, this 
article is divided into two parts. The first section reviews the opinions of the Supreme Court‟s 
Justices in Parents Involved because of its potentially far-reaching effect. The second part of the 
article reflects on the meaning of Parents Involved while also helping to set the tone for much of 
the rest to this special issue of Education and Urban Society. The article rounds out with a brief 
conclusion. 
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Introduction 
 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Parents 
Involved, 2007), a highly contentious, and divided, Supreme Court invalidated race-conscious 
admissions plans in two urban school systems, Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky. 
The Court struck both programs down on the ground that they were insufficiently narrowly 
tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. As such, Parents Involved was the 
latest chapter in the Court‟s almost forty-year history of reaching mixed results in such far-
reaching areas involving race-conscious remedies as admissions to higher education (DeFunis v. 
Odegaard,
 
1974; Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
 
1978; Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003); employment in the general workforce (United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 1979; Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, 1986); United States v. Paradise, 1987; Johnson 
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 1987) and in education (Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education, 1986a, b); minority set aside programs (Fullilove v. Klutznik, 1980; 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 1990a, b; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1995); and voting 
rights (United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 1977; Shaw v. Reno, 1993; Miller v. Johnson, 
1995; Bush v. Vera, 1996). 
 Based on the impact that the Supreme Court‟s rulings on race-conscious remedies have 
played in education, particularly in K-12 schools in urban settings, this article is divided into two 
parts. The first section reviews the opinions of the Supreme Court‟s Justices in Parents Involved 
in some detail because of the case‟s potentially far-reaching effect. The second part of the article 
reflects on the meaning of Parents Involved while also helping to serve as a backdrop for much 
  
 
3 
of the rest to this special issue of Education and Urban Society. The article rounds out with a 
brief conclusion. 
 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 
 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 involved two 
separate cases on race conscious admissions plans, also commonly referred to as affirmative 
action, in public school systems that were argued together at the Supreme Court. This section 
reviews the judicial histories of the two cases before examining the opinions of the Justices in 
Parents Involved.  
 
McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools 
 Litigation ensued in Louisville, Kentucky, the twenty-eighth largest school system in the 
United States, home to 97,000 students (McFarland v. Jefferson County Public School, 
(McFarland, 2004, p. 839), when dissatisfied parents challenged a district-wide, race-conscious 
school choice plan. Earlier, officials implemented the plan even though the district had been 
released from judicial supervision for school desegregation in 2000 (Hampton v. Jefferson 
County Board of Education, 2000).  
 On appeal of an order upholding the plan (McFarland, 2004), the Sixth Circuit, in 
McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools (2005), affirmed its 
constitutionality. In a brief, one paragraph opinion, the court agreed that the plan was acceptable 
because the school board had a compelling interest in using racial guidelines and applied them in 
a manner that was narrowly tailored to realize its goals. The court explained that since the plan 
was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling governmental interest of preserving the presence  
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of minority students in each school as a means of successfully implementing racial integration, it 
passed constitutional muster.  
 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
 Parents Involved was a procedurally complex case from Seattle, Washington, a school 
system which never been segregated by law even though it was involved in a 1982 Supreme 
Court case on busing. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 (1982) the Court invalidated 
a law from Washington that was adopted by a statewide referendum that was designed to prevent 
student assignments to remedy de facto segregation. The Court explained that the law was 
unconstitutional because in allowing local school boards to make all assignments except those 
for race-connected purposes, it violated the Equal Protection Clause, a topic that is discussed 
below. Based on their stated goal of eliminating what they described as thirty years of racial 
isolation in the city‟s public schools (Parents Involved, 2001, p. 1225), in 2000 educational 
leaders in the 46,000 student school system developed an “open choice” plan to attempt to 
redress inequities in student assignments (Walsh, 2007). 
 Parents in Seattle, Washington, sued their school board over the “open choice” 
assignment plan, claiming that it violated the Equal Protection Clause and state laws by 
unconstitutionally relying on race as the tiebreaker in assigning students to oversubscribed high 
schools. In the initial round of litigation, a federal trial court granted the school board's motion 
for summary judgment, finding that the use of race in the open choice policy tiebreaker did not 
violate the equal protection clause because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest (Parents Involved, 2001).  
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of the parents (Parents Involved, 2002a) 
but withdrew its opinion when it agreed to a rehearing (Parents Involved, 2002b) while asking 
the Supreme Court of Washington to review the case. The panel requested that the Supreme 
Court of Washington consider whether the use of a racial tiebreaker in making high school 
assignments violated a state law against discrimination, or granting preferential treatment to, 
individuals or groups due to race, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public 
schools. 
 The Supreme Court of Washington ruled that while racial diversity in education is a 
compelling interest, since the board's use of race as a tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored to 
further such an interest, it violated the state constitution (Parents Involved, 2003). The Ninth 
Circuit then reversed and remanded in favor of the parents with instructions to enjoin the plan 
(Parents Involved, 2004). The panel thought that the racial integration tiebreaker violated a state 
law which prohibited the preferential use of race in public education. Subsequently, an en banc 
panel of the Ninth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court‟s rulings in Grutter and Gratz, cases 
from the University of Michigan which, respectively, rejected race conscious admissions policies 
in undergraduate programming while allowing its use in the Law School, contended that the plan 
did not violate equal protection since its use of race was sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve 
the compelling state interest of avoiding racial isolation while increasing diversity (Parents 
Involved, 2005). The court decided that the plan was constitutionally acceptable because it met 
the requirements of Grutter and Gratz insofar as the school board engaged in a good-faith 
consideration of race-neutral alternatives. 
 After agreeing to hear an appeal (Parents Involved, 2006) in Parents Involved In 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1 (2007), a highly divided Supreme Court 
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struck down plans from Seattle and Louisville that classified students by race in making school 
assignments.
 
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered its 
opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C, in which Justice Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Alito joined and which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined as to Parts III-B and IV. 
Justice Thomas concurred. Justice Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. 
Justice Stevens dissented. Justice Breyer‟s dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg.  
 
 Opinion of the Court 
 Stipulating that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race (p. 2768), Chief Justice Roberts, as a reflection of his 
adopting a more active leadership role on the Supreme Court, wrote an opinion that is both the 
Opinion of the Court, namely those portions joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito and a four Justice plurality that was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, but not 
Justice Kennedy. At the outset, the Court defined the issue as “whether a public school that had 
not operated legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to classify 
students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments (p. 2746).” The 
Court then reviewed the facts of the cases and declared that it had jurisdiction to resolve the 
dispute. 
 At the heart of its analysis, the Supreme Court employed equal protection analysis in 
applying strict scrutiny but did so in such a way that it represents a significant development in 
many respects. Briefly stated, equal protection analysis recognizes that since all governmental 
actions impact Americans, their constitutionality depends on the degree to which they interact 
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with protected rights. On the one hand, the general constitutional test for classifications is 
whether they are rationally related to legitimate governmental purposes. To this end, there is a 
strong, but rebuttable, presumption that laws enacted through the legislative process are 
constitutional. In explaining this test, the Supreme Court determined that “. . .  if a law neither 
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative 
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end (Romer v. Evans, 1996, 
p. 632).”   
 On the other hand, when laws or the actions of governmental officials allegedly limit 
fundamental constitutional rights, such as equal protection under the law or treat individuals 
differently on the basis of constitutionally “suspect” factors such as race, the courts apply the 
“strict scrutiny” test and are unlikely to uphold such classifications unless they are based on 
compelling justification. Insofar as strict scrutiny analysis shifts the burden shifts to the 
government to prove the existence of a compelling need for such classifications, they must be as 
narrowly drawn as possible.  Still, when courts apply the so-called strict scrutiny test, 
governmental actions are almost always struck down. 
 Some classifications, such as illegitimacy and gender, although not at issue in Parents 
Involved, belong to a third category that is subject to heightened scrutiny. In limited 
circumstances, the Supreme Court has adopted an intermediate standard of review that is not as 
difficult for the government to meet as the compelling interest test but which involves less 
deference to legislation than the rational relations test. In these cases, courts reject classifications 
unless they have “substantial relationships” to “important” governmental interests. 
In its application of strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court initially held that correcting a 
racial imbalance in elementary and secondary schools was not, without more, a compelling 
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governmental interest. The Court noted that “we have emphasized that the harm being remedied 
by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation,” and that “the 
Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more. Once Jefferson 
County achieved unitary status, it had remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed race-based 
assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis” (Parents 
Involved, at 2752).  In doing so, the Court emphasized that a racial imbalance was of no 
constitutional consequence. 
 As to its resolution of educational equality, it is worth noting that the courts have 
typically utilized two competing “paradigms” of educational equality. The first such test, the 
“Numerical Parity Paradigm” focuses on ensuring that racial and gender groups are adequately 
represented. This paradigm concerns disparate impact and ensuring that traditionally excluded 
groups such as racial minorities, women, and the poorer economic classes are adequately, if not 
proportionally, represented. Implicit in this paradigm is the assumption that one group must be 
advantaged, at least on a temporary basis, to atone for the previous sins against it. This paradigm 
focuses on objective criteria such as number of participants and assumes, at least implicitly, that 
all groups have an equal desire to pursue certain opportunities.  
When taken to its logical conclusion, the Numerical Parity Paradigm results in numerical 
or financial quotas. In the Numerical Parity Paradigm at its extreme, change is brought about by 
forcing educational institutions to adopt rigid numerical quotas for each gender or race and then 
finding persons of the appropriate gender or race to fill the quotas. Under this approach, persons 
are valued not so much for their individuality as for their membership in a particular gender 
group. Moreover, in the numerical parity paradigm, the emphasis is on the impact of a policy or 
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decision. The fact that no one made a conscious choice to discriminate is irrelevant. What 
matters is that one group was disadvantaged more than another.  
 Second, other courts have utilized a second test, the “Non-Discrimination Paradigm,” 
which focuses on ensuring that race or gender of individuals are never considerations in 
educational decision-making and that students have the opportunity to attend a quality school. 
Implicit in this paradigm is the assumption that individuals, regardless of race, should be treated 
the same. This paradigm ensures that there is no overt or covert gender discrimination in either 
participation opportunities or treatment. Rather than focusing on equality of numbers, the non-
discrimination paradigm considers equality of treatment. As such, the paradigm acknowledges 
that individuals may place different values on given programs. Thus, this paradigm would 
require that no students be treated differently or excluded simply because of race, gender, or 
economic status.  
Under the non-discrimination paradigm, change occurs by requiring educational 
institutions to adopt affirmative steps to promote full acceptance of persons as individuals, not as 
members of a group, and by encouraging all persons to maximize the use of their particular 
talents and to pursue their specific interests in sports and other activities. Pursuant to this 
approach, persons are treated as individuals, are accorded dignity and respect, and are permitted 
to meet their personal objectives. In light of the Non-Discrimination Paradigm‟s emphasis on the 
“marketplace” of desires and respect for individual differences, change is much slower than in 
the quota driven numerical parity paradigm. Moreover, in the non-discrimination paradigm, the 
emphasis is on conscious decisions to exclude or to treat differently. The fact that a neutral 
policy may have the unintended consequence of affecting one group more than another is 
considered irrelevant under this paradigm.  
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 The Supreme Court next found that obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body is simply not a compelling interest in K-12 context. This part of the opinion stands 
in strong contradistinction to the University of Michigan racial preference cases, Grutter and 
Gratz, wherein, a mere four years earlier, the Justices decreed that obtaining the educational 
benefits of a diverse student was a compelling governmental interest in the higher education 
context. In refusing to apply a diversity rationale in the context of K-12 schooling, the Court 
emphasized the unique nature of optional higher education. The Justices thus determined that the 
disputed school board policies inappropriately treated race as the decisive factor rather than 
merely as one factor among many. In fact, the Court chided local school officials for viewing 
“race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/‟other‟ terms” (Parents Involved, 
p. 2754).” 
 The Supreme Court reemphasize that if racial classifications are going to survive strict 
scrutiny, then they must be effective in achieving a compelling governmental interest. The Court 
noted that “the minimal impact of the districts‟ racial classifications on school enrollment casts 
doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications (Parents Involved, p. 2760).” The Court 
expanded this rationale in maintaining that “[c]lassifying and assigning schoolchildren according 
to a binary conception of race is an extreme approach” that “requires more than such an 
amorphous end to justify it (p. 2760).” By demanding that racial classifications actually achieve 
the compelling objective, the Court made it more difficult for the government to pursue the use 
of race in school admissions. 
 Finishing up its majority rationale, the Supreme Court strengthened the requirement that 
the government consider race-neutral alternatives before utilizing racial classifications. At this 
point, the Justices conceded that they deferred to the University of Michigan‟s assertions in 
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Grutter that race neutral alternatives would be ineffective. However, the Court refused to expand 
this deference in K-12 public education, responding that local school officials “failed to show 
that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals 
(Parents United, p. p. 2761).” 
 In sum, the Supreme Court‟s rationale Parents Involved signals the majority‟s 
reaffirmation of the principle that the Equal Protection Clause prevents the government from 
treating people differently due to race. Of course, differing treatment is allowed if it is a narrowly 
tailored means of remedying the present day effects of past intentional discrimination by the 
government. Moreover, in the higher education context, differing treatment is allowed if it is a 
narrowly tailored means of achieving the educational benefits of a diverse student body.  In 
refusing to allow racial preferences in order to achieve racial balances, the Court rejected racial 
balancing in K-12 education as a compelling interest, limited the pursuit of diversity to higher 
education, demanded that racial classifications actually work, and directed educational officials 
to consider non-racial alternatives in student assignments. In this way, the Court made it more 
difficult for governmental agencies to pursue racial balancing.  
 
 Chief Justice Roberts’ Four Justice Plurality 
 Chief Justice Roberts‟ plurality, that portion of the Court‟s opinion that was not the 
judgment of the Court, had had the support of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, effectively 
adopted the first Justice Harlan‟s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). In Plessy, 
using language that presaged Brown v. Board of Education (1954), Justice Harlan reasoned that 
“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In 
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law (p. 559).”  
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In his analysis, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that “accepting racial balancing as a 
compelling state interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout 
American society (Parents Involved, p. 2757).” Further, Roberts remarked that “[a]llowing racial 
balancing as a compelling end in itself” would ensure “that race will always be relevant in 
American life” and “would support indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to 
obtain the appropriate mixture of racial views and then to ensure that the [program] continues to 
reflect that mixture (Parents Involved, p. 2758).” Roberts went on to declare that “[r]acial 
balancing is not transformed from „patently unconstitutional‟ to a compelling state interest 
simply by relabeling it „racial diversity‟ [or avoidance racial isolation or promotion of racial 
integration] (Parents Involved, p. 2759).” 
 Next, the Roberts plurality insisted that Brown stands for the proposition that 
“segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities…because government 
classification and separation on grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority (Parents 
Involved, p. 2767).” Roberts made it clear that if school boards are “to achieve a system of 
determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis,” then boards must “stop 
assigning students on a racial basis (Parents Involved, at 2768).” The Chief Justice thus viewed 
non-discrimination as the constitutional command. 
 In conclusion, the Roberts plurality asserted that race has no role in governmental 
decision-making except when it is used remedially as in United States v. Paradise (1987),   
wherein the Court upheld the use of percent promotion requirement for state troopers in Alabama 
under the equal protection clause since it was justified by the compelling governmental interest 
in eradicating the past discriminatory exclusion of African Americans from such positions and 
was narrowly tailored to serve its stated purposes. While the majority opinion effectively 
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prohibited the direct consideration of race, the Roberts plurality effectively forbade the indirect 
consideration of race. 
 
 Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
 Justice Kennedy‟s concurrence focused on the difference between the indirect and direct 
consideration of race (Parents Involved, 2007. p. 2788), analysis that was consistent with the 
Supreme Court‟s rationales in Gratz and Grutter. Still, Justice Kennedy viewed the Roberts 
plurality‟s endorsement of a color-blind constitution as “inconsistent in both its approach and its 
implications with the history, meaning, and reach of the Equal Protection Clause (Parents 
Involved, p.  at 2788).” In particular, Kennedy would have permitted local school board officials 
“to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse 
student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition” as long as officials avoided “treating 
each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race 
(Parents Involved, p. 2788).”  
Justice Kennedy‟s opinion stands for the notion that school board officials can consider 
race in building new schools, drawing attendance boundaries, allocating resources, and recruiting 
students for special programs. He further ascertained that “[t]hese mechanisms are race 
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he 
or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be 
found permissible (Parents Involved, p. 2788).” 
 While Justice Kennedy refused to accept a color-blind constitution, he found the dissent‟s 
embrace of racial balancing to be “a misuse and mistaken interpretation of our precedents. This 
leads it to advance propositions that, in my view, are both erroneous and in fundamental conflict 
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with basic equal protection principles (Parents Involved, p. 2788).”  In addition, he joined four 
other Justices in forming the Opinion of the Court that adopted the Non-Discrimination  
Paradigm while rejecting the Numerical Parity Paradigm. 
 
 Justice Thomas’ Concurrence 
 Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas joined all aspects of the Roberts opinion 
(Parents Involved, p. 2768). Nevertheless, he was compelled to write separately to address 
Justice Breyer‟s dissent. In addition to allying fears that Seattle or Louisville would become 
resegregated, Justice Thomas emphasized the constitutional equivalence between race-based 
assignments designed to help racial minorities and race-based assignments designed to hinder 
minorities, rejecting the dissent‟s argument that student assignment plans should be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. He also set out a comprehensive explanation as to why he believes that the color-
blind interpretation of the Constitution is correct. 
 
 Dissenting Opinions 
  Justice Stevens’ Dissent 
In a brief, but bitter, dissent Justice Stevens stated that he joined Justice Breyer‟s dissent 
in full (Parents Involved, p, 2797). Even so, he wrote a separate opinion expressing his 
contention that the current majority had turned its back on Brown, bitterly charging that The 
Court has changed significantly over the past forty years. To this end, he decried that the Court 
“was then more faithful to Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my 
firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with 
today's decision (p. 2800).” 
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  Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
 Justice Breyer‟s lengthy dissent (Parents Involved, 2007, p.  2800), which was joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, maintained that since the plans at issue were sufficiently 
narrowly tailored, especially since they were developed by democratically elected school boards, 
they should have been upheld. Not unlike Justice Stevens, Breyer feared that the outcome in 
Parents Involved would lead to additional segregation in schools based on race. 
 
Reflections 
 On the one hand,  the Supreme Court declared that “[e]ducation, of course, is not among 
the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis 
for saying it is implicitly so protected (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
1973, p. 35)." Yet, at the same time, in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Court 
acknowledged that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments (p. 493).” The Court added that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education (p. 493).”   
To the extent that “Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution 
for the preservation of a democratic system of government,” (Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 1963, p. 230), every State Constitution has a provision mandating, at a minimum, that 
the State provide a system of free public schools (Thro, 1998). Yet, despite the importance 
placed on education in the Nation‟s fundamental charters, American public schools remain 
inherently unequal and the worst schools inevitably fail. Indeed, “there are very few people who 
have the temerity to stand up and say that the public school system is doing a good job of 
educating its students. Virtually everyone who comments on education, be they defenders or 
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enemies of the establishment, agrees that the system is in dire need of reformation (Peyser, 1994, 
p. 626).” 
 Insofar as the failure of the public schools is particularly clear in urban centers (Pixley, 
1998), which continue to be more segregated than they were a generation ago (Frankenberg & 
Orfield, 2007), African-American and Hispanic students are disproportionately affected whether 
in regular or special education (Russo & Talbert-Johnson, 1997). “[T]the gap in educational 
achievement between black and white students was so great that it threatened to defeat any other 
attempts to narrow the economic differences separating blacks and whites (Murray, 1984, p. 
105).” Data suggest that minority students‟ mastery of basic skills is less than half of that of their 
white counterparts. The profound educational policy problem of our time is how to equalize 
educational opportunities.  
 In Parents Involved, the Opinion of the Court, the four-Justice Roberts Plurality, and 
concurring opinions do not directly address the problem of equalizing educational opportunities, 
but the opinions have profound implications for how policy makers may respond to the problem. 
The net effect of the opinions is to remove the opposition of achieving equal opportunities 
through racial integration. As reflected in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Constitution 
requires an end to de jure segregation. Further, while later cases mandate the elimination of the 
lingering effects of segregation (Freeman v. Pitts, 1992), Parents Involved (pp. 2757-59) noted 
that the Court has yet to mandate racial integration (Russo & Talbert-Johnson, 2004). Indeed, as 
Justice Thomas acknowledged in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved, pursuing racial 
integration for the sake of racial integration is forbidden: 
Racial imbalance is the failure of a school district‟s individual schools to match or 
approximate the demographic makeup of the student population at large. Racial 
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imbalance is not segregation. Although presently observed racial imbalance might 
result from past de jure segregation, racial imbalance can also result from any 
number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices. 
Because racial imbalance is not inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation, 
it is not unconstitutional in and of itself (p. 2769). 
If the problem of educational inequality is solved, it will be solved without utilizing race. 
 Given the prohibition on the use of race, policy-makers have two possible approaches.  
First, educational inequality is caused by a wide variety of factors including administrative 
mismanagement and the problems endemic to poverty, but the prohibition on race based student 
assignments seems likely to result in renewed focus on school finance. As one scholar observed: 
Urban schools generally face incredible, if not intractable, problems, as “dropout 
rates hover well above 50 percent, truancy is the norm rather than the exception, 
violence is common, students struggle for basic literacy . . . and the physical 
condition of the schools is a disgrace.” Black males appear to be faring most 
poorly under current conditions (Barnes, 1997, p. 2376, quoting Cookson, Jr., 
1994, p. 2).  
Despite receiving funds from both federal and state sources, all local school districts, except 
those in Hawaii, raise much of the money necessary for operations through a percentage tax, with 
the rate set by the local residents, on the value of the real property in the district. Due to differences 
in rates and in the value of real property, this system results in vast disparities. As a result, some 
school systems have trouble providing even the basics while others are able to offer educational 
luxuries.  
Sadly, the disparities in local funding have long been so great that “[i]f a state without a 
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previous history of public financing were now proposing the initiation of a plan, it is highly unlikely 
that the system of dual responsibility [both local and state] would be adopted (Johnson, 1979, p. 
327).” While State legislatures and governors have adopted various mechanisms to correct this 
financial inequality, the disparities remain.  
Given the obvious conflict between the constitutional value of free public education for al 
and the funding disparities created by the States‟ school finance systems, it is not surprising that 
the courts have been asked to intervene and vindicate the constitutional value of free public 
education for all by declaring that the current system of financing the schools is unconstitutional. 
Indeed, over the last four decades,
 
the high court of virtually every State has wrestled with the 
question of whether the State‟s school financing system is constitutional. However, since a 
judicial solution to the problem has proved as elusive as a legislative or executive solution, 
America‟s other constitutional values actually undermine the judiciary‟s efforts to solve the 
problem (Thro, 2005, p. 2005). 
 Second, a prohibition on the use of race may well force school board officials to focus on 
the socio-economic status of students and their families. Although a socio-economic preference 
may advantage certain racial and ethnic groups disproportionately, such disproportionate impact 
is not constitutionally problematic. By shifting the emphasis from race to socio-economic status, 
the school district is recognizing that race is frequently used as a “proxy for other characteristics that 
institutions value but that do not raise similar constitutional concerns (Hopwood v. Texas, 1996, p. 
946).” At least on its face, such an approach eliminates race as a relevant factor.  Thus, it should be 
possible for school board officials to arrange students assignments so that the poor, the middle class, 
and the rich are represented in each school. Such intermixing of socio-economic classes likely will 
result in the most of the same benefits generally attributed to racial integration without encountering 
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constitutional difficulties.  More significantly, socio-economic integration may begin to eliminate 
the achievement gaps that plague urban schools. 
  
Conclusion 
 Parents Involved represents a significant turning point for urban schools. While the 
problems of educational inequality remain, the Supreme Court has sent the clear message that, 
except in those few school systems that have failed to achieve unitary status, student assignments 
may not be based on race.  In other words, then other tools, such as assignments based on socio-
economic status or increased funding for certain programs, will have to replace the current practice 
of seeking equality through racial balance.  In moving toward, if not actually adopting, Justice 
Harlan‟s vision of a colorblind Constitution, the Court is not signaling an abandonment of the core 
values of Brown. Rather, the Court is defining Brown’s core value as a principle of non-
discrimination and is suggesting that there needs to a fundamental change in our approach to the 
elimination of educational inequality. 
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